

Fire-Rescue Department Engine Brownout Plan and Lifeguard Reductions Update



Public Safety & Neighborhood Services Committee
September 22, 2010
Fire Chief Javier Mainar

Report Focus

- 7th Report to PS&NS
- Brownout Plan
 - Workload and Response Time Statistics Update
 - Projected and actual savings realized
 - Training and inspection impacts adjustments
 - Significant incident (child choking death)
- Lifeguard Budget Reductions
 - Beach Coverage Statistics Update
 - Savings realized
 - Beach coverage and training impacts adjustments

Brownout Plan Refresher

- Brownouts Defined
 - Temporary closure of 0-8 fire engines per day
 - Implemented in the 13 stations with more than one response unit
- Brownouts implemented on February 6, 2010 as a budget reduction measure to save \$11.5M in overtime
- Each brown-out unit saves approximately \$1.4M annually
- Today's report covers Feb. 6 though Sept. 15, 2010
 - 69,858 emergency incidents during this period
 - 2,105 fires
 - 60,344 medical
 - 7,409 other

Statistical Summary of Brownouts

- Out-of-Service Time for Participating Engines = 32% - 100%
- Compliance with 5 min. First Unit Arrival Response Time
 - National Standard = 90% Fire-Rescue Interim Target = 55%
 - City-Wide Same Period Last Year = 55%
 - City-Wide During Brownouts = 54%
 - Participating Districts Same Period Last Year = 28% - 86%
 - Participating Districts During Brownouts = 24% - 80%
- Average Response Times (minutes/seconds)
 - City-Wide Same Period Last Year = 5:03
 - City-Wide During Brownouts = 5:07
 - Participating Districts Same Period Last Year = 3:49 - 6:16
 - Participating Districts During Brownouts = 3:50 - 6:36

Effective Fire Force

- Defined as the number of firefighters required to perform operations at a typical single family dwelling fire
 - 14-15 firefighters depending on whether an aerial ladder is deployed
 - SDFD achieves this with 3 engines, 1 truck and 1 battalion chief
- Compliance with 9 min. Effective Fire Force Arrival Response Time
 - National Standard = 90% Fire-Rescue Interim Target = 72%
 - City-Wide Same Period Last Year = **70%**
 - City-Wide During Brownouts = **72%**
 - Participating Districts Same Period Last Year = **20% - 100%**
 - Participating Districts During Brownouts = **0% - 100%**
- Average Effective Fire Force Response Times
 - City-Wide Same Period Last Year = **7.94 minutes**
 - City-Wide During Brownouts = **7.73 minutes**

Analysis of Response to Child Choking Fatality

- Death of two-year-old child in Mira Mesa on July 20, 2010
- An engine response time of 9.5 minutes resulted from:
 - Multiple incidents occurring at the same time (call stacking)
 - Brownout of Engine 44 (Mira Mesa)
- Closest engine would have been available to respond if not for brownouts and its response time would have been approx. 2 minutes
- It is not known whether an earlier arrival could have saved the child's life; however, earlier intervention by paramedics is desirable due to higher level of training and availability of specialized equipment
- Police officers, paramedics, and fire fighters did all they could do to save Bentley Do's life

Non-Emergency Impacts and Adjustments

- Reduced Manipulative Training Opportunities
 - Fewer units makes it difficult to go out-of-service for training
- Training Adjustments Made
 - Units allowed out-of-service at one time increased from 12 to 14
 - Units in Department-wide training sessions decreased from 5 to 3
 - More training delivered at fire stations or online
- Delays in Completing Fire Inspections
 - Fewer units are busier with emergency responses
 - Unable to keep up with fire inspection workload
 - 90-day overdue inspections up from 12% (April) to 20% (Aug)
 - Results in greater risk and revenue collection delays
- Inspection Adjustments Made
 - Light duty staff assigned when available

Brownout Projected vs. Actual Savings

Projected savings for last half of FY 2010 = \$4.2 million

FY 2010 brownout savings realized = \$4,174,806

FY 2011 Projected Savings = \$11.5 million



Lifeguard Reductions

■ Personnel

- 8 Lifeguard FTEs
 - 4 filled (demoted to LGI)
 - 4 unfilled
- 1 Lifeguard II Training Coordinator
- Reduction of Hourly LG Budget
- Reduction of Overtime Budget



■ Non-Personnel

- Overlap Training Wednesdays Eliminated
- River Rescue Team Training Budget Cut by 50%

Impacts of Reductions

- Loss of Beach Coverage
 - 2 fulltime LGs in Fall, Winter and Spring/1 fulltime LG in Summer
 - 3 hourly LGs on weekdays in Summer and 4 hourly LGs on weekends
 - Hourly LG positions during Spring Break and Spring/Fall weekends
- Operational Adjustments Made for Beach Coverage
 - 2 hourly LGs patrolled Torrey Pines Beach in summer
 - Standard Operating Procedure for Torrey Pines Beach responses
- Loss of Training Opportunities
 - Only minimum training required for safety being provided
- Adjustments Made for Training
 - Pre-shift and in-service training modules developed
 - Winter training plan developed for 10/2 implementation

Incidents at Torrey Pines Beach (6/16 thru 7/15)

- City Portion of Beach (553 incidents)
 - 29- Medical Aid
 - 0- Water Rescues
 - 5- Cliff Rescues
 - 511- Preventive Actions
 - 1-Enforcement
 - 7 - Other calls for service

- Non-City Portions of Beach (563 incidents)
 - 88- Medical Aid
 - 0- Water Rescues
 - 0- Cliff Rescues
 - 470- Preventive Actions
 - 0-Enforcement
 - 5 - Other calls for service

Wind n' Sea Beach Coverage/Incidents

- Budget Reduction Staffing at Wind 'n Sea Beach
 - Seasonal staffing in place/No year-round staffing provided
- Staffing Reductions Made to Achieve Budget Savings
 - 1 fulltime LG in Summer
- Incident Count (1271 incidents)
 - 58- Medical Aid
 - 97- Water Rescues
 - 1,052- Preventive Actions
 - 0-Enforcement
 - 0- Other calls for service

Lifeguard Budget Reduction Savings

Lifeguard reductions for the last half of FY 2010 were a prorated shared of the FY2011 savings shown below.

FY2011 savings = \$721,915



Questions?