



THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO
REPORT TO THE CITY COUNCIL

DATE ISSUED: January 26, 2011 REPORT NO:
ATTENTION: Public Safety and Neighborhood Services Committee
SUBJECT: Engine Company Brownout and Lifeguard Reductions Monthly Report
REFERENCE: None

REQUESTED ACTION

This is an informational item only. No action is required by the Committee or the City Council.

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

Accept the Report.

INTRODUCTION

This is the tenth monthly report to the PS&NS Committee on the status of the Engine Company Brownouts and Lifeguard reductions being administered to achieve budgetary savings in the Fire-Rescue Department. Brownouts are defined as the temporary closures of up to eight fire engines per day in those fire stations housing more than one emergency response apparatus.

This month's report will update workload, brownout frequency, and response time statistics since the inception of the Brownout Plan on February 6, 2010 through January 14, 2011. It will also address an increase in the number of overdue inspections performed by Engine and Truck Companies, an increase in the time necessary to assemble an Effective Fire Force (EFF), and impacts to Fire and Lifeguard Training.

SUMMARY

During this reporting period (February 6 to January 14, 2011), the thirteen engines subject to brownout were out-of-service from 33% to 99% of the time. As a result, compliance with the 5 minute 90% of the time national response standard for the first due unit has declined to 24% to 80% within these districts and 54% city-wide as compared to 28% to 87% in these districts and 56% city-wide for the same period last year. Average response times increased by 6 seconds within these districts and by 7 seconds city-wide when compared to the same period last year.

Response times for the assembly of an Effective Fire Force of 14-15 firefighters (3 engines, 1 truck and 1 battalion chief) within the 9 minutes 90% of the time national response standard was 0% to 100% within

these districts and 69% city-wide as compared to 43% to 100% respectively and 73% city-wide for the same period last year. It should be noted that this is the first time this standard has fallen below our performance target since the brownouts began. Average response times for an Effective Fire Force also increased within these districts and city-wide when compared to the same period last year.

STATISTICAL DATA

Following is cumulative statistical data for the emergency response districts subject to fire engine brownouts and the response time impacts city-wide for the period indicated.

Brownout Frequency

Data in the table below reflects the percentage of total operational hours in the reporting period (days in period x 24 hours) that the indicated engine company was out of service due to placement in brownout status.

**Percent of Time Units Browned Out
 02/06/2010 – 1/14/2011**

Community	Engine	Pct.
College	E10	98.66%
Downtown	E201	49.56%
East Village	E4	33.32%
Golden Hills	E11	47.70%
Kearny Mesa	E28	42.62%
Lincoln Park	E12	36.62%
Midway	E20	50.09%
Mira Mesa	E44	99.24%
North Park	E14	49.23%
Pacific Beach	E21	49.76%
Rancho Penasquitos	E40	99.24%
San Ysidro	E29	47.72%
University City	E35	41.91%

Number of Emergency Responses

Data in the table below reflects the total number and type of emergency incidents that occurred within the City during the reporting period.

**Overall System Wide
 02/06/2010 – 1/14/2011**

	Fire	Medical	Other	Total
2/6/09-1/14/10	3,303	86,961	11,963	102,227
2/6/10-1/14/11	3,333	94,449	11,856	109,638
Percent Change	0.91	8.61	-0.89	7.24

City-wide Response Time Performance

This following data reflects City-wide response time performance expressed in two formats. The first table shows the percentage of incidents where no more than 5 minutes elapsed from the time an engine or truck company was notified of an emergency response and their arrival at the scene of the emergency. The nationally accepted standard is 90% and the Department's current performance target is 55%. The second table uses the same notification and arrival time stamps, but reports response times as an average (mean).

**5 Minutes or Less Response Time
 Percentage (1st Arriving Engine or Truck)**

2009-2010 Pct	2010-2011 Pct	Percent Change
55.53%	53.55%	-3.57

**Average Response Time
 (1st Arriving Engine or Truck)**

2009-2010 Avg	2009-2010 Avg	Percent Change
0:05:02	0:05:09	2.14

Data Reported by Brownout Community

The data in the following tables uses the same criteria as described above, but breaks the data down by individual community.

**Browned Out Districts
 Incident Counts
 02/06/10 – 1/14/11**

	2009-2010			2009-2010			Percent Change		
	Fire	Medical	Other	Fire	Medical	Other	Fire	Medical	Other
College (Sta. 10)	74	2,275	264	76	2,580	263	2.70	13.41	-0.38
Downtown (Sta. 201)	46	1,951	346	62	2,115	368	34.78	8.41	6.36
East Village (Sta. 4)	68	3,614	461	82	4,067	418	20.59	12.53	-9.33
Golden Hills (Sta. 11)	90	1,883	195	95	1,994	176	5.56	5.89	-9.74
Kearny Mesa (Sta. 28)	107	2,177	576	121	2,423	545	13.08	11.30	-5.38
Lincoln Park (Sta. 12)	179	4,134	349	169	4,354	314	-5.59	5.32	-10.03
Midway (Sta. 20)	72	2,777	364	78	3,162	338	8.33	13.86	-7.14
Mira Mesa (Sta. 44)	71	1,434	274	54	1,424	237	-23.94	-0.70	-13.50
North Park (Sta. 14)	122	2,624	263	102	2,889	252	-16.39	10.10	-4.18
Pacific Beach (Sta. 21)	77	2,834	362	88	3,059	391	14.29	7.94	8.01
Rancho Penasquitos (Sta. 40)	49	1,130	162	42	1,209	162	-14.29	6.99	0.00
San Ysidro (Sta. 29)	56	3,037	159	80	3,453	144	42.86	13.70	-9.43
University City (Sta. 35)	157	2,715	834	131	2,927	854	-16.56	7.81	2.40

5 Minutes or Less Response Time Percentage First Arriving Engine or Truck	2009- 2010 Pct	2009- 2010 Pct	Pct Change
College (Sta. 10)	54.07%	46.18%	-14.60
Downtown (Sta. 201)	80.84%	80.14%	-0.86
East Village (Sta. 4)	86.72%	79.73%	-8.06
Golden Hills (Sta. 11)	73.88%	66.40%	-10.12
Kearny Mesa (Sta. 28)	39.24%	35.54%	-9.41
Lincoln Park (Sta. 12)	49.49%	45.43%	-8.20
Midway (Sta. 20)	52.07%	51.47%	-1.16
Mira Mesa (Sta. 44)	40.44%	32.62%	-19.35
North Park (Sta. 14)	75.82%	68.28%	-9.95
Pacific Beach (Sta. 21)	60.37%	48.55%	-19.59
Rancho Penasquitos (Sta. 40)	28.08%	23.66%	-15.76
San Ysidro (Sta. 29)	60.11%	57.05%	-5.10
University City (Sta. 35)	34.80%	27.90%	-19.83

Average Response Time (First Arriving Engine or Truck)	2009- 2010 Avg	2009- 2010 Avg	Pct Change
College (Sta. 10)	0:05:01	0:05:17	5.37
Downtown (Sta. 201)	0:03:47	0:03:50	1.25
East Village (Sta. 4)	0:03:47	0:04:04	7.71
Golden Hills (Sta. 11)	0:04:14	0:04:36	8.70
Kearny Mesa (Sta. 28)	0:05:41	0:05:55	3.98
Lincoln Park (Sta. 12)	0:05:11	0:05:23	3.93
Midway (Sta. 20)	0:05:10	0:05:16	1.95
Mira Mesa (Sta. 44)	0:05:51	0:06:08	4.89
North Park (Sta. 14)	0:04:07	0:04:31	9.79
Pacific Beach (Sta. 21)	0:04:41	0:05:14	11.90
Rancho Penasquitos (Sta. 40)	0:06:13	0:06:43	8.25
San Ysidro (Sta. 29)	0:04:58	0:05:07	3.10
University City (Sta. 35)	0:06:11	0:06:34	6.27

Effective Fire Force

This following data reflects response time performance for the assembly of the 14-15 firefighters needed to complete the tasks necessary to combat a typical residential structure fire. In our City, this is achieved by the response of 3 engines, 1 truck, and 1 battalion chief. The table shows both City-wide and brownout district performance. The nationally accepted standard is 9 minutes 90% of the time and the Department's current performance target is 9 minutes 72% of the time.

Effective Fire Force*
2/6 /10-01/14/11

		2009-2010	2009-2010	2009-2010	2010-2011	2010-2011	2010-2011
Community	Engine	Percent 9 Min	Average (Minutes)	Count	Percent 9 Min	Average (Minutes)	Count
College	10	88.89%	7.79	18	70.59%	7.82	17
Downtown	201	93.33%	5.38	15	93.33%	5.46	15
East Village	04	100.00%	4.84	31	80.65%	6.46	31
Golden Hills	11	100.00%	5.61	21	100.00%	6.23	26
Kearny Mesa	28	66.67%	7.87	9	73.91%	8.29	23
Lincoln Park	12	81.25%	7.21	32	80.65%	7.45	31
Midway	20	70.00%	8.04	10	76.92%	11.40	13
Mira Mesa	44	62.50%	8.63	8	9.09%	11.54	11
North Park	14	100.00%	6.04	28	100.00%	6.16	22
Pacific Beach	21	66.67%	8.68	18	55.56%	9.04	9
Rancho Penasquitos	40	50.00%	9.28	6	0.00%	11.62	7
San Ysidro	29	66.67%	9.17	6	71.43%	8.83	7
University City	35	43.33%	10.05	30	37.84%	10.70	37
City Wide		72.83%	7.67	622	69.16%	8.14	629

* 28 incidents originally dispatched as single engine responses and later upgraded were not included in this EFF calculation

SERVICE DELIVERY IMPACTS

There is ample scientific data to support that the more quickly the right type and number of resources can be brought to bear on an emergency incident, generally speaking, the better the outcome. Under the best of circumstances, multiple concurrent calls for service, routine maintenance, training, community educational outreach events, administrative activities, and unit location at the time of an incident dispatch can all impact incident response times.

Because many variables can influence incident outcomes, it is very difficult to isolate changes in incident outcomes resulting solely from brownouts. However, it can be safely assumed that any emergency receiving a delayed response for any reason will result in undesired impacts. In the case of fires, the most likely impact is increased fire spread and damage and the increased possibility of injury or death. In the case of a medical emergency, the impact may be prolonged pain from an injury, distress from a medical condition, or greater risk of permanent injury or death.

Service delivery impacts are felt by all requestors for emergency response whenever a response is delayed due to brownouts or other reasons. However, accurately isolating the specific impacts of the brownouts on victim survival probability proves to be extremely difficult and it is important to note that over the past five years an average of four persons per year have died as a result of fires in our City.

Non-emergency brownout impacts include a noticeable increase in the number of fire inspections performed by our engine and truck companies that are late in being completed and increased difficulty in conducting manipulative training due to the number of units committed to incidents or out-of-service status.

To address the late inspections impacts, light duty personnel have been assigned to assist in completing these inspections when they are available. In April of last year, 12% of the inspections performed by companies were more than 90 days overdue. Currently, 31% are overdue, an increase from 27% at the last report. These overdue inspections increase risk associated with not identifying and correcting fire code violations and slow the collection of inspection fee revenues. Per the Committee's request, the IBA has prepared a report on the fiscal impact of the delayed inspection fee collection.

To address the challenges in freeing units from emergency response status to conduct required training, the number of units permitted to be temporarily out-of-service at one time was increased from 12 to 14. In addition, the number of units removed from service to attend manipulative training sessions for 4 hours in the morning and afternoon at the Regional Public Safety Training Institute has been reduced from 5 (or 4) to 3 (or 2) units. When possible, these training sessions have been reduced by sending an instructor to the fire station or delivering the training in an online format to increase unit availability.

Significant Emergency Response Impacts during this Reporting Period

On November 29, 2010, at 0950 hours a residential structure fire was reported at 3535 Mt. Burnham Court, in the community of Clairemont. The fire originated in the garage, and before it was extinguished had penetrated the kitchen and attic of the dwelling, causing approximately \$600,000 in damage. There were no injuries. The fire was the result of an electrical malfunction in plant growing equipment in the garage.

Engine Availability Analysis

Engine 36, the first due engine for this address, was out of service due to a mechanical issue and was enroute to the repair facility. Engine 28, the second due unit, was browned out. Engine 27, the third due unit, was out of service and enroute to the repair facility for a mechanical inspection. Engine 23 was also out of service mechanical and enroute to the repair facility for a "regeneration" of its smog system. Engine 5, from the community of Hillcrest was enroute to in-service training. As a result, the first due engine was Engine 25 from Bay Park. It took 9 minutes and 48 seconds for that engine to arrive, four minutes and 48 seconds longer than our goal. An effective fire force did not assemble until 13 minutes and 5 seconds after dispatch, four minutes and five seconds longer than our goal.

Conclusion

Due to a number of apparatus in the same area needing immediate mechanical attention, the brownout of Engine 28, and a unit's travel to scheduled training, response was delayed to this address. An increased loss to this dwelling was the result of the delay.

LIFEGUARD DIVISION

The Lifeguard Division contributed to budgetary savings via a number of reductions. Impacts from reductions taken have been felt in several areas of lifeguard operations: lifeguard coverage, training activities, increased workloads for supervisors, personnel schedules and Reductions in Force (RIF). These impacts are discussed below.

Budget Reduction Impacts on Lifeguard Training

Prior to the mid-year budget reductions implemented in January 2010, all permanent Lifeguards, other than those assigned to the night crew, were scheduled to be on-duty on Wednesdays. With the Lifeguard Division split into two shifts, on Wednesdays, one shift would be assigned to training while the other would be assigned to operations. Thus, the two shifts would rotate between operations and training allowing for ten hours of training on alternate Wednesdays during the six months of the year when beach attendance was at its lowest levels.

To achieve budgetary savings for Fiscal Years 2010-2011, dedicated training on Wednesdays was eliminated and employee schedules were altered to create additional relief shifts. These relief shifts allow the Lifeguard Division to cover open operational shifts on straight time rather than with overtime. Additionally, the River Rescue Team had its annual training reduced by half. Both of these changes resulted in a reduction in the overtime budget. The Lifeguard Division also eliminated one Lifeguard II position dedicated to developing, organizing, and conducting training. Budgetary savings achieved by these reductions are \$236,000 in overtime and \$68,912 for the LGII FTE.

These budget impacts have reduced training opportunities. Refresher training for essential skills is being provided, albeit in a manner that is overall less effective than in years past. Additionally, other training important to ensure long term effectiveness and succession planning of Lifeguard Services is difficult to achieve. A modified training plan was developed and implemented beginning October 2, 2010. This plan will continue to be evaluated and revised throughout the winter months.

Contract Discussion with UCSD for Lifeguard Coverage at Torrey Pines

The department continues to pursue an agreement with the University of California, San Diego in regard to lifeguard coverage in the Torrey Pines area. The proposed contract is now being reviewed by UCSD.

Update on Torrey Pines Incidents

The following incidents have been recorded for Torrey Pines City Beach. Responses came from lifeguards assigned at La Jolla stations or from other districts.

Torrey Pines City Beach Responses 11/01/2010 to 01/18/2011	Total
Medical Aids (via 911 or Call Box)	2
Water Rescues	0
Cliff Rescues/Recoveries	0
Preventative Actions (cliff & water warnings/non-rescue calls)	14
Enforcement	2
Other Calls for Service	1
Total Incidents	19

The following incidents have been recorded for the non-City sections of Torrey Pines Beach:

Torrey Pines Beach Response (non-City sections) 11/01/2010 to 01/18/2011	Total
Medical Aids (via 911 or Call Box)	1
Water Rescues	0
Cliff Rescues/Recoveries	0
Preventative Actions (cliff & water warnings/non-rescue calls)	12
Enforcement	1
Other Calls for Service	2
Total Incidents	16

FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS

The brownouts are projected to achieve an FY2011 budgetary savings of \$11.5M.

The Lifeguard Division reductions to overtime, Torrey Pines operations, Wind 'n' Sea operations and operational relief hours are projected to achieve an FY2011 budgetary savings of \$721,915.

PREVIOUS COUNCIL and/or COMMITTEE ACTIONS


N/A

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND PUBLIC OUTREACH EFFORTS

Ongoing

KEY STAKEHOLDERS AND PROJECTED IMPACTS

Community and Citizens



Javier Mainar, Fire Chief