


## STANDARDS OF RESPONSE COVER REVIEW

**FEBRUARY 22, 2017** 








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**VOLUME 2 of 3 – Technical Report (separately bound)** 

**VOLUME 3 of 3 – Map Atlas (separately bound)** 





The City of San Diego (City) retained Citygate Associates, LLC to perform a Standards of Response Coverage (deployment) review for the Fire-Rescue Department (Fire-Rescue). This study included reviewing the adequacy of the current fire station resource deployment system, the risks to be protected, and the emergency incident outcomes desired by the community. This report is presented in three volumes, including this Executive Summary (Volume 1) summarizing our findings and recommendations, a Technical Report (Volume 2) that includes a Standards of Coverage (deployment) assessment and community risk assessment, and a geographic map atlas (Volume 3) that displays fire unit travel time coverage. Throughout the technical volumes of this study, Citygate makes key findings, and, where appropriate, specific action item recommendations. Overall, there are 26 key findings and 3 specific action item recommendations.

#### 1.1 Policy Choices Framework

First, as the Mayor, City Council, and Fire-Rescue Executive Management understand, there are no mandatory federal or state regulations directing the level of fire service response times and outcomes delivered by the City. The level of service and resultant costs are a local community choice in the United States. The body of regulations on the fire service provides that *if fire services are provided, they must be done so with the safety of the firefighters and citizens in mind.* There is a constructive tension between a desired level of fire services and the level that can actually be funded. Thus, many communities do not have the level of fire services they may desire.

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In growing urban areas like San Diego, it is an even harder challenge to keep fire service levels consummate with growth along with all the other competing needs as General Fund revenues grow over the years. Since the recession ended, San Diego has started to significantly reinvest in its fire services.

This study will identify that, in the near term, additional investment in fire services is still necessary as San Diego continues to evolve and consider the service level choices for its fire services. The fundamental policy choices are derived from two key questions:

- 1. What outcome is desired for an emergency? Is the desire to keep a building fire to the room, building, or block of origin? Is it also to provide paramedic care in time to lessen the possibility of preventable death and severe disability?
- 2. Should equitable response time coverage be provided to all similar risk neighborhoods? Once the outcomes are stated, the fire and emergency medical services deployment system can be designed to cover the geography in the time necessary to meet the stated outcome goals.

#### 1.2 CITYGATE'S OVERALL OPINIONS ON THE STATE OF THE CITY'S FIRE SERVICES

The City's fire and emergency medical services have not kept pace with growth, partially due to the long recession, and are unable still to meet best practice outcome response times to all neighborhoods. To its credit, the City has staffed the fire crews at the best practice level of four personnel, but does not have enough crews to cover a city the size of San Diego. Many emerging western state cities allow non-contiguous neighborhoods to develop somewhat quickly over a few years. Stated this way, new urbanizing communities do not tend to grow outward from a solid core, with a grid or "right angle" classic street system. Communities build in clusters and connect meandering subdivision streets to each other with longer main boulevards. For quality of life and land owners, this can be a beneficial pattern. For fire services agencies trying to maintain response times from the most efficient (fewest) number of fire stations, it is **not** a cost-effective community design plan as most urban communities want best outcome response times to keep small fires small, and to save people with potentially fatal medical emergencies.

If best outcome response times <u>to all similar risk and population density neighborhoods</u> are desired, then in the near term, San Diego should bring on line at least 10 more infill gap fire stations plus what is needed for entirely new growth areas.

Traffic congestion is also an increasing problem that further strains Fire-Rescue's response time coverage at morning and evening commute times. The City's growing employment base and regional, post-recession economic jobs recovery is yielding intense traffic congestion at rush hours. The geographic information system (GIS) travel time analysis in this study, and the prior

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incident travel time data for Fire-Rescue's responses, clearly show the substantial hindrance this causes to emergency response travel in the City.

#### 1.3 STANDARDS OF COVER ASSESSMENT TECHNICAL SUMMARY

Fire department resource deployment, simply stated, is about the speed and weight of the attack. Speed calls for first-due, all-risk intervention units (engines, ladder trucks, ambulances, and/or specialty units) strategically located across a department service area. These units are tasked with controlling moderate emergencies, preventing the incident from escalating to second alarm or greater size, which unnecessarily depletes department resources as multiple requests for service occur. Weight is about multiple-unit response for serious emergencies, such as a room and contents structure fire, a multiple-patient incident, a vehicle accident with extrication required, or a heavy rescue incident. In these situations, enough firefighters must be assembled within a reasonable time frame to safely control the emergency, thereby keeping it from escalating to greater alarms.

In *Part One* of **Volume 2** of this study, Standards of Cover Assessment, Citygate's analysis of prior response statistics and use of geographic mapping tools reveals that the City *does not* have an adequate number of fire stations to serve its diverse topography and population densities. The maps provided in **Volume 3** and the corresponding text explanation beginning in **Volume 2** describe Fire-Rescue's current performance in detail.

For effective outcomes on serious medical emergencies and to keep serious, but still emerging, fires small, the City's adopted Fire-Rescue response time policy is that the first-due fire unit should arrive within 7:30 minutes/seconds of fire dispatch receiving the 9-1-1 call, 90% of the time. Fire-Rescue's actual performance from fire dispatch call receipt to first crew on scene is 8:10 minutes/seconds to 90% of fire and emergency medical services (EMS) incidents. As can be seen in light grey shading in Table 1, only seven station areas meet a 90% best practice goal of 7:30 minutes/seconds from fire dispatch receipt to first unit on scene:

<u>Table 1—Fire Dispatch Receipt to Arrival Time Analysis</u> (90% Baseline Performance in RY 15/16)

Battalion/Station	Time
Department-Wide	08:10
Battalion 01	07:14
Station 01	06:53
Station 03	08:55
Station 04	06:56
Station 07	06:46
Station 11	07:47
Battalion 02	07:52
Station 05	07:43
Station 08	07:10
Station 14	06:50
Station 18	07:48
Station 23	08:04
Station 28	08:30
Station 36	08:29
Battalion 03	08:25
Station 15	07:46
Station 20	08:29
Station 21	07:45
Station 22	08:36
Station 25	08:53
Station 27	08:41
Battalion 4	07:58
Station 10	07:49
Station 17	07:29
Station 26	07:39
Station 31	08:25
Station 34	08:02
Station 39	08:15
Station 45	08:56

Battalion/Station	Time
Battalion 5	09:19
Station 09	08:53
Station 13	07:49
Station 16	09:05
Station 24	09:55
Station 35	09:23
Station 41	10:03
Station 47	09:26
Battalion 6	08:05
Station 06	07:57
Station 12	07:43
Station 19	07:30
Station 29	08:16
Station 30	07:38
Station 32	07:51
Station 43	11:36
Station 51	07:35
Battalion 7	08:41
Station 33	09:04
Station 37	08:48
Station 38	08:17
Station 40	08:40
Station 42	08:22
Station 44	08:39
Station 46	09:26

Fire-Rescue does meet the City's goals for dispatch and crew turnout time. The issue with response times is the travel time from too few fire stations across an increasingly traffic-congested road network. Fire-Rescue is not meeting the City's adopted goal of "5:00 minutes"

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*travel time*" for the first arriving unit. The reality is, as shown in the next table, instead of a 5:00-minute response time <u>from crew notification</u>, the Citywide actual performance is 06:09 minutes, or 1:09 longer. Only four fire station areas meet the 5:00-minute travel time goal, as shown in light grey:

Table 2—Travel Time Analysis (90% Baseline Performance in RY 15/16)

Battalion/Station	Time
Department-Wide	06:09
Battalion 01	05:06
Station 01	04:43
Station 03	06:34
Station 04	04:45
Station 07	04:44
Station 11	05:42
Battalion 02	05:58
Station 05	05:42
Station 08	05:15
Station 14	04:59
Station 18	05:55
Station 23	06:09
Station 28	06:31
Station 36	06:35
Battalion 03	06:26
Station 15	05:47
Station 20	06:26
Station 21	05:48
Station 22	06:21
Station 25	06:59
Station 27	06:54
Battalion 4	06:00
Station 10	05:52
Station 17	05:33
Station 26	05:36
Station 31	06:25
Station 34	05:59
Station 39	06:35
Station 45	07:01

Battalion/Station	Time
Battalion 5	07:18
Station 09	06:51
Station 13	05:41
Station 16	07:28
Station 24	07:50
Station 35	07:14
Station 41	08:00
Station 47	06:59
Battalion 6	06:03
Station 06	06:04
Station 12	05:41
Station 19	05:32
Station 29	06:15
Station 30	05:33
Station 32	05:55
Station 43	09:19
Station 51	05:35
Battalion 7	06:41
Station 33	06:57
Station 37	06:56
Station 38	06:22
Station 40	06:38
Station 42	06:31
Station 44	06:36
Station 46	07:07

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These results are reflective of the large size of some station areas, simultaneous calls for service, road network design, and traffic congestion issues. Fire-Rescue is staffed for several serious building fires at a time, and multiple medical calls for service at a time. The regional automatic and mutual aid response system delivers greater alarm and multiple-incident support, when needed, although with longer response times.

It is valuable to compare the travel time Citywide from the 2010 study to this 2017 update:

 Year
 Travel Time % at 5 Minutes
 Minutes/Seconds @ 90%

 2010
 74.5%
 6:20

 2017
 77.1%
 6:15

Table 3—Travel Time Comparison from 2010 to 2017

While travel time performance is slightly better, even with post-recession traffic congestion, the City has not to date added enough resources to reduce Citywide travel to 5 minutes to 90% of the incidents. Short of adding additional fire stations given the City's road network and traffic congestion, there is no way to appreciably lower emergency fire unit *travel* times.

Population drives service demand and development brings population, which increases traffic congestion. Traffic congestion now has measurable, negative effects on fire unit travel times during rush hours. The geographic mapping analysis in this study found that only 74% of the City's public streets are within 5 minutes travel time of an *active* fire station. Of the current fire stations, travel coverage at commute hours is negatively impacted down to 51% of the road miles. More importantly, the multiple-unit Fire-Rescue coverage at commute hours is much more severely impacted down to 6%, as several units must travel across large sections of the City. The maps in this study show where this normal and reduced coverage occurs.

In the current Capital Improvements Program (CIP) budget, work is underway to add six fire stations. Of these, two are not part of the identified 2010 study gaps. One is downtown, west of the rail tracks. Another station is part of a developer agreement in a new growth area. There are many steps to add a fire station, and the current six stations being planned do not all yet include funding for site, design, and construction.

When the six stations in the current CIP budget work plan are on line, the first-due coverage improves by only 71 road miles or 1% of the Citywide total. These six stations also improve First Alarm multiple-unit coverage by a more significant 403 road miles, or 3% of the Citywide total. These measures illustrate why it is so expensive to increase station coverage and "catch up" for the years or even decades of growth creating station coverage gaps, and why at least more than the six currently being planned stations are necessary.

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If, however, at least another six large gap infill stations are added to the current six new growth and infill gap stations already in the CIP development budget, a total of 12 added fire stations will add another almost 5% to 5-minute coverage, which raises the percent of coverage for the existing road miles *up to 80.6*%. This would be very good coverage given the challenging topography of San Diego.

Determining the timing of adding additional fire stations is complicated with issues other than the population, incidents, and 5-minute covered miles measured by Citygate in this study. The other issues to consider in siting a station are new growth proposed nearby, land cost, availability, zoning, environmental, and traffic safety to mention a few. The timing of all infill sites will be determined by City staff as they address the siting issues and forward CIP budget requests to the City Council as part of the normal budget cycle. In addition, Fire-Rescue is also expending significant funding to tear down and rebuild or renovate existing stations as the facilities age. Doing so competes for funding for additional gap infill stations.

Please see Appendix A for a complete list of all the fire station areas identified in the 2010 and 2017 studies and their current status in the planning process.

#### 1.4 OVERALL DEPLOYMENT EVALUATION

San Diego Fire-Rescue serves a very diverse land use pattern with a geographically challenging and limited road network in some areas. While the state-mandated Fire Code has required fire sprinklers in many commercial buildings and even in dwellings, it will be many more decades before enough buildings are replaced or remodeled using automatic fire sprinklers. For the foreseeable future, the City will need both a first-due firefighting unit and Effective Response Force (First Alarm) coverage in all parts of the City, consistent with current best practices, if the risk of the fire is to be limited to only part of the inside of the affected building.

As described, Fire-Rescue is not meeting the City's goal of "5:00 minutes travel time." The reality is instead of a 5:00 minute response time from crew notification, the actual Citywide performance is 06:09 minutes (or 1:09) longer. Citygate submits there are three principal reasons for this situation: (1) too few stations; (2) traffic congestion; and (3) high workload rates on many key engine companies.

As the 2010 study identified, over several decades as the City grew outward from its historic core neighborhoods, it did not add enough fire stations to equitably cover all areas with best-practices-based response times. The only way to materially improve response times is to add the fire stations identified in this study.

Fire-Rescue is to be commended; it is meeting its goals for dispatch and crew turnout time, so these times cannot be materially lowered.

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Citygate's 2010 study identified 10 priority infill gaps fire stations. At present, four are in process of being sited and funded. Others are in preliminary research and development. If an additional six gap fire stations identified in the 2010 and 2017 update study were to be funded, then there would be 10 infill fire stations deployed in the identified 5-minute travel gaps on the existing road network. This quantity of 10 infill stations needed *is the same count* as in the 2010 study. Stated this way, San Diego is programming at present four of the 10 largest needed infill fire stations.

#### 1.5 RISK ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Citygate conducted an in-depth community risk assessment, found in *Part Two* of **Volume 2** of this study. The following list briefly summarizes Citygate's evaluation of the values at risk and hazards likely to impact the City of San Diego:

- The City has a very diverse population, with densities ranging from less than 1,000 per square mile to more than 56,000 per square mile.
- The City's population is projected to grow by 24% over the next 18 years to 2035, with similar projected growth in residential housing units, non-residential development, and employment.
- ◆ Approximately 23.35% of the City's population is under 10 years of age or over 65 years of age, which are considered at-risk populations for most emergencies.
- Nearly 16% of the City's population is below the federal poverty level for the previous 12 months, an increase of 1.7% since 2000.
- ◆ The City has 705 designated critical facilities/infrastructures to protect.
- The City has significant economic values at risk as identified in this assessment.
- A significant percentage of the City lies within a Very High Wildland Fire Hazard Severity Zone as identified by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.
- Fire-Rescue has developed and implemented multiple mitigation measures to effectively reduce wildland fire impact severity within the City.
- ◆ The City's overall risk for seven hazards related to emergency services provided by Fire-Rescue ranges from *LOW* to *MAXIMUM*.

#### 1.6 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Shown below are all findings and recommendations from Volume 2—Technical Report.

#### 1.6.1 Findings

#### Standards of Cover Assessment Findings

Finding #1: The City Council has adopted a complete and best-practices-based deployment measure for fire and emergency medical services incidents. Adopting a similar set of specialty response measures would meet the best practice

recommendations of the Commission on Fire Accreditation International.

Finding #2: Fire-Rescue follows best practices by using a standard response dispatching plan that considers the risk of different types of emergencies and pre-plans the response. Each type of call for service receives the combination of engine companies, truck companies, ambulances, specialty units, and command officers customarily needed to handle each type of incident based on experience.

**Finding #3:** Minimum apparatus staffing per unit on engine and ladder truck companies at four is a recognized best practice for the City's size and risks.

Finding #4: Using the current 47 fire station locations, only the most-developed population density areas are within 5 minutes travel time of a fire engine. Traffic congestion has a marked negative impact on unit travel times in many fire station service areas.

Finding #5: Only some of City's core areas are within 8 minutes travel time of an Effective Response Force assignment of four engines, one ladder truck, one ambulance, and two Battalion Chiefs, with *no traffic congestion*. During traffic congestion this coverage *only occurs* in sections of downtown and Mission Valley.

Finding #6: Even having grown over the years from five to seven Battalions, the northern and southern City station areas are not within 8 minutes travel time. It will take at least the addition of three more Battalion Supervisors per day to more completely cover the City. Adding these Battalion Supervisors also will increase the two-chief coverage on First Alarms.

**Finding #7:** The *single* ladder truck coverage is adequate for the current needs of the City but the coverage will have to be re-evaluated as new growth areas are added beyond the identified infill gap fire stations.

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Finding #8: Completing the six station sites currently being programmed in the near term

Capital Improvement Program will add significant new coverage at peak hours

of the day.

**Finding #9:** If  $\underline{six}$  of the largest gaps identified in the 2017 Citygate study were filled over

time with a fire station and at least one fully-staffed engine, as funds allow, the total population receiving improved coverage would amount to 80,036 residents at current population levels. In the last year, these gaps experienced a total

incident demand of 1,641.

**Finding #10:** If the currently programmed four infill gap fire stations plus the six largest gaps

identified in the 2017 Citygate study (totaling ten) were added to the fire station system, Citywide 5-minute travel time coverage would improve from 74.7% to

80.6%.

Finding #11: If the City public road miles remain static, then Citygate would not recommend

adding more than 10 infill gap fire stations to the present system. The remaining gaps are too small and, if necessary, could be covered with the use of Fast Response Squads or peak activity engine companies during daylight hours. Of course, any completely new growth areas could also be large enough to justify

added fire stations in addition to the 10 infill gap stations identified.

**Finding #12:** The highest volume hours for incidents span from 9 am through 9 pm, and even

later on Friday and Saturday. Given this, where additional units are needed for high workload volumes, they could be peak-hour units for 12 hours per day, 7

days per week.

Finding #13: National best practices as recommended by National Fire Protection Association

Standard 1221 are for call processing to be 90 seconds, 90% of the time, and

120 seconds, 99% of the time. Fire-Rescue is substantially meeting this goal.

Finding #14: Fire-Rescue's realistic goal for turnout time is 90 seconds to 90% of the

emergent incidents. San Diego is just under this goal and is to be commended

for its performance meeting a best-practices-based goal.

**Finding #15:** In the Report Year 15/16 measurement period, Fire-Rescue had a 90% travel

time Citywide of 6:09 minutes/seconds. This travel time is 1:09 minutes longer than the City's goal of 5:00 minutes. This travel time is fairly consistent across urbanized areas of the City, as only four station areas in San Diego were under a 5-minute travel time goal. To substantially reduce travel time, more fire stations

are necessary.

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- Finding #16: Due to longer travel times, with the current quantity of fire stations, Fire-Rescue only has seven station areas performing better than the City's adopted Emergency Command and Data Center 9-1-1 call receipt to arrival time of 7:30 minutes/seconds. The station areas with the longer travel times also have the longest call receipt to arrival times.
- **Finding #17:** While some engines reach mid-20% Unit-Hour Utilization workloads, no engines approach a Citygate-recommended threshold of 30% hour after hour. At peak hours of the day, while many engines are busy responding to EMS events, adding flexibly deployed engines into gap areas would provide the greatest possible reduction to response times to neighborhoods the farthest from fire stations.
- **Finding #18:** The busiest ladder trucks only approach 10% Unit-Hour Utilization workloads and at this time, relief or added ladder trucks are not necessary where there is already adequate ladder truck coverage.

#### Risk Assessment Findings

- **Finding #19:** A significant percentage of the City lies within a *Very High* Wildland Fire Hazard Severity Zone as identified by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE).
- **Finding #20:** The Draft 2015 San Diego County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan identifies four actions to address wildland fire risk in the City of San Diego.
- Finding #21: Fire-Rescue inspects more than 49,000 parcels within the City's Very High Wildland Fire Hazard Severity Zones and Wildland Urban Interface areas to ensure that required defensible space is appropriately established and maintained.
- **Finding #22:** Fire-Rescue has developed standardized Wildland Urban Interface pre-fire plans addressing management of wildland fires within targeted high-risk areas of the City.
- Finding #23: Fire-Rescue is currently developing a Citywide Community Risk Assessment emphasizing "Sharing the Responsibility." The program is aimed at enhancing wildland fire risk awareness in the City's Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) by providing information on wildfire preparedness, "Ready, Set, Go", defensible space, and structure hardening that can assist homeowners in reducing the impacts of a wildland fire.

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**Finding #24:** The City has established appropriate emergency evacuation protocols, procedures, and resources in its Citywide Emergency Operations Plan, Police Department Procedures, and Fire-Rescue Procedures.

**Finding #25:** The City has established multiple effective concurrent methods to communicate emergency evacuation information to the public in a timely manner.

**Finding #26:** The City regularly utilizes, validates, and evaluates its emergency evacuation protocols, procedures, and resources to ensure ongoing emergency evacuation readiness and effectiveness.

#### 1.6.2 Recommendations

#### Standards of Cover Assessment Recommendations

#### **Recommendation #1:** Address Service Gaps by Adding Fire Stations and Resources:

- 1.1 Identify the funding and timing to complete the current six fire stations in the City's Capital Improvement Program budget.
- 1.2 Identify the sites for six infill fire stations to lower the Citywide travel time performance closer to 5 minutes in the most urbanized areas per the City's adopted policy.
- **Recommendation #2:** Add Battalions: In addition to the added fire stations, the City should eventually add at least three more geographic area Battalions.
- **Recommendation #3:** Add Peak-Hour Units: Fire-Rescue needs to continue to add peak-hour, flexibly-deployed units, squads, and/or engines to support the busiest areas at peak hours of the day and to allow full-time crews to go off-line for training in rotation.

#### 1.7 THE PATH AHEAD

If the City wants to provide the following three outcomes, the City will have to increase its deployment of fire crews by adding at least 10 key missing fire stations. The three outcomes are:

- Provide equitable response times to all similar risk neighborhoods.
- Provide for depth of response when multiple incidents occur.
- ◆ Provide for a concentration of response forces in the core for high-risk venues.

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If the City chooses <u>not</u> to continue these three policy goals for fire services delivery, then it should adopt a travel time goal that it can afford, understanding that longer response times will mean the most time-sensitive emergencies could experience worse than desired outcomes.

In addition to the added fire stations, the City will eventually need to add at least three more geographic area Battalions.

Last, to maintain response times and training schedules during peak incident demand hours of the day, Fire-Rescue should increase the use of peak-hour activity units, using squads and/or full engine companies.

Since the recession, the City has started to address adding fire stations to both infill gaps and new growth areas. The goals identified in Recommendation #1 will continue to expand this program. Measurement and planning as the City continues to evolve over time will be necessary for the City to meet these goals. Citygate recommends that the City's next steps be to work through the issues identified in this study over the following time lines:

#### 1.7.1 Short-Term Steps

- Absorb the policy recommendations of this fire services study.
- Direct staff to commence work to site, procure, and program funding for the needed infill gap fire stations.
- Develop the costs and a timeline for the balance of the stations not already having City-owned sites and/or committed construction funding.

#### 1.7.2 Long-Term Steps

- ◆ Add at least three more geographic area Battalions to increase the two-chief coverage on First Alarms.
- ♦ Monitor the effect of growth and traffic congestion on incident demand volume at peak hours of the day.
- ◆ If traffic congestion continues to decay response times, even with additional fire crews, then more peak-hour squads and/or engines will become necessary to maintain response times to critical events.
- Once the added station construction schedule is better determined, build a staffing impacts model to allow Fire-Rescue to budget ahead of time for the hiring and promotional testing necessary to bring more fire crews on line.



### APPENDIX A

# Statusof Fire Station Areas Identified in the 2010 and 2017 Studies



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#### APPENDIX A—STATUS OF FIRE STATION AREAS IDENTIFIED IN THE 2010 AND 2017 STUDIES

2010 GAP			2017 GAP*				
2010 ID	Council District	Fire Station	Community Planning Area	2017 ID	Council District	Community Planning Area	Current Status
1	4/9		Mid-City: City Heights				Capital Improvement Program (CIP) created; pursuing land purchase at 47th and Fairmount Avenue
2	4	FS54	Skyline-Paradise Hills	Gap 4 N	4	Southwestern Skyline-Paradise Hills	No land identified; CIP created; no funding
3	9		College Area				CIP created; no funding
4	4	FS51	Skyline-Paradise Hills				Station in-service (temporary facility); CIP created; no funding
5	4	SQ55	Encanto	Gap 4 S	4	North eastern Encanto	Squad in-service; 61st and Imperial Avenue; no CIP
6	1	SQ56	University	Gap 2	1	Southern University	Squad in-service; Governor Drive and Dunant Street; no CIP
7	2		Pacific Beach	Gap 1	2	Pacific Beach	No CIP or activity
8	1		University				UCSD Fire Station project; in negotiations
9	2		Peninsula				No CIP or activity
10	1	FS50	University				Nobel and Shoreline; CIP created; land secured; station in design
11	1		Torrey Hills	Gap 3	1	Torrey Hills/South Carmel Valley	No CIP or activity
12	6/7		Serra Mesa				No CIP or activity
13	6		Mira Mesa				No CIP; possibility future development will build station
14	8		Otay Mesa				No CIP or activity; see "FS49 – Otay Mesa" in bottom row of this table
15	5		Scripps Miramar Ranch				No CIP or activity
16	5	SQ57	San Pasqual				Squad in-service
17	7		Linda Vista				No CIP or activity

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2010 GAP			2017 GAP*					
2010 ID	Council District	Fire Station	Community Planning Area	2017 ID	Council District	Community Planning Area	Current Status	
18	1	FS48	Black Mountain Ranch				Carmel Valley Road and Winecreek Road; land secured; in negotiations with developer for construction; potential reimbursement agreement; partial Facility Benefit Assessment (FBA) funding to date	
19	2		Mission Valley				No CIP or activity	
				Gap 5	5	North eastern Ranch o Bernardo	Newly identified	
				Gap 6	5	Southern Sabre Springs	Newly identified	
Sit es Idei	Sites Identified by Fire-Rescue After 2010 Study							
	3	FS02	Downtown				Pacific Highway and Cedar; CIP created; fully funded, station under construction ("Bayside")	
	3		Downtown				No CIP or activity; north of Broadway between 13th and 14th Street ("East Village")	
	8	FS49	Otay Mesa				Named FS49; Ocean View Hills area; CIP created; developer built; FBA funding; no current activity; station is west of 2010 Gap #14	

<sup>\*</sup> No priority weight is given to 2017 gaps.

Underway in planning, either with service established or active work being performed. Council Districts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 9 are represented.

There are three gaps that carry over from 2010 to 2017 that have had no activity.

